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NOTES
NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED? ESTABLISHING A
SELF-EVALUATIVE PRIVILEGE FOR CORPORATE
INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
"Great corporations exist only because they are created and
safeguarded by our institutions; and it is therefore our right and our
duty to see that they work in harmony with these institutions .... The
first requisite is knowledge, full and complete."'
INTRODUCTION
The public image of corporate America has taken a beating.2
Arguably, no period of history has seen corporations struggle
through such a widespread range of civil and criminal enforcement
activities at the hands of government agencies.' On any given day
1. Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Message (Dec. 3, 1901), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edulshowdoc.php?id=744&type=l&president=26 (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
2. In fact, "[t]he rising criticism of the large corporation has in the last decade reached
such a pitch that it seems quite reasonable to believe that we are witnessing what will prove
to be a radical discontinuity in the institution's historical development." RUSSELL B.
STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION: SECRECY, ACCESS AND DISCLOSURE 4
(1980).
3. According to one author:
Like so many of humankind's major technological developments ... the large
business corporation has brought ... no smill number of serious problems.
Indeed, so closely linked has the corporation become in the popular mind with
the inevitable malfunctions of our enormous and enormously complex economic
system that today's common parlance refers more often to the evils and
misdeeds of the "corporation" than to those of "big business" or the "malefactors
of great wealth" as was the case not so many years ago. Whether fairly or not,
the "corporation," rather than the business system of which it is a part, is
increasingly being singled out as the villain in the controversies surrounding
many, if not most, of the more important problems confronting the society.
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the business sections of the country's newspapers are full of grand
jury testimony, indictments, and settlement agreements between
federal enforcement agencies and high-profile corporations or their
boards of directors. According to the Washington Post, "[a] former
top mutual fund executive pleaded guilty ... to tampering with
evidence to thwart a probe of illegal trading and agreed to pay
$400,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission to settle
allegations that he cut deals giving special trading privileges to
certain wealthy customers. 4 On the same day, "[tihe New York
Stock Exchange ... found evidence that the five largest of seven
'specialist' firms that control trading on the exchange regularly
engaged in abusive practices .... [that] have cost investors as much
as $150 million,"' and "[a] former executive with the McKesson
Corporation pleaded guilty... to securities fraud charges in connec-
tion with an accounting scandal that cost shareholders of the
company $9 billion."' While the New York Times affirmed that
"Richard M. Scrushy, the founder and ousted chief executive of
HealthSouth, refused to answer lawmakers' questions ... about his
knowledge of a fraud scheme at the company,"7 the Wall Street
Journal reported that "U]ury deliberations in the fraud trial of a
former Rite Aid Corp executive headed into a third day, after jurors
failed to reach a verdict yesterday."8 Although shockingly extensive,
perhaps the most troubling aspect of these headlines is that they
represent only one day in the life of corporate America.
In response to the increased pressure resulting from these public
embarrassments, corporations have turned to internal investiga-
tions as a way of placating federal investigators and fulfilling their
fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders.9 At the most basic
Id. at 3-4.
4. Brooke A. Masters, Ex-Executive Pleads Guilty in Fund Probe: Former Alger Worker
Settles with SEC, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2003, at El.
5. Kathleen Day & Ben White, NYSE Finds Proof of Trading Abuses: Exchange to Fine
Firms Responsible, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2003, at El.
6. Former Executive Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at C6.
7. Milt Freudenheim, Former Chief of HealthSouth Refuses to Respond at Hearing, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at C7.
8. Rite Aid Jurors Still Meeting, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2003, at C9.
9. In fact, "[finternal corporate investigations have become an established response to
allegations of improprieties on the part of the corporation, its officers, or its employees."
Thomas R. Mulroy & Eric J. Mufioz, The Internal Corporate Investigation, 1 DEPAUL BUS. &
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level, internal investigations involve an extensive fact-finding effort
on the part of either a corporation's general counsel or an independ-
ent legal professional. 10 Corporations may initiate an internal
investigation "in response to an ongoing government investigation
or agency subpoena, pursuant to a consent decree with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), or another government agency,"'" or "[a]n investigation may
... be prompted internally, through either a complaint or grievance
from an employee or group of employees."' 2 Once a threat to a
corporation's stability becomes apparent, both directors and
managers may hold an affirmative duty to investigate any potential
irregularities.'3 Accordingly, the decision to conduct an internal
investigation can have far-reaching impacts, both positive and
negative."
Regardless of the immediate motivation, a corporation may
realize some important benefits from conducting an internal
investigation.'5 First, a corporation that releases the results of an
internal investigation to government regulators may be able to
secure more lenient civil or criminal penalties. 6 Second, conducting
COM. L.J. 49, 49 (Fall 2002).
10. Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil, Overview: Initiating an Internal Investigation and
Assembling the Investigative Team, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LITIGATION,
INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 2, 6-13 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed.
2003).
11. Mulroy & Mufioz, supra note 9, at 49.
12. Id. At any rate,
the need for an investigation usually becomes known because: (1) management
has received internal information of suspected wrongdoing from employees or
agents of the company; (2) management has been alerted to a government
investigation through receiving a grand jury subpoena or learning that
government investigators have been conducting interviews; or (3) the company
has been threatened with civil litigation that raises questions of serious
improprieties.
DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 4-2 (Release 19 2003).
13. Id. (footnote omitted). As such, "management must obtain a command of the facts and
applicable law" in order to fulfill their fiduciary duty to act in the corporation's best interest.
Id. In fact, the "[flailure to do so may increase the likelihood that the company will face
criminal, administrative, or civil liability, jeopardize government contracts, threaten customer
and supplier relationships, and crush employee and managerial morale." Id.
14. See Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 6-8.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 7. Although some practitioners argue that "the benefits of voluntary
disclosure are greatly overstated," voluntary disclosure can present a number of benefits to
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an internal investigation allows a corporation to respond pro-
actively to any potential litigation by controlling the flow of relevant
information. 17 Third, even in the absence of litigation, an internal
investigation may help improve corporate performance.'" At the very
least an internal investigation is concrete evidence that a corpora-
tion's directors have fulfilled their fiduciary duties to their share-
holders."9
As with any business decision, corporate directors must balance
these benefits against the potential risks of conducting an internal
investigation. By definition, conducting an internal investigation
presents the probability of discovering damaging information.2 ° In
addition, a corporation may be inviting a federal enforcement action
by sharing the results of an internal investigation with government
regulators in the absence of an immunity or confidentiality agree-
ment.2 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a corporation that
prepares an internal investigation always runs the risk that the
final product may be discoverable in subsequent civil litigation.22 In
other words, even if an investigation is prepared in cooperation with
an enforcement agency, potential plaintiffs may be able to gain
access to a corporation's most sensitive information. In this scenario
a corporation that has acted in good faith to discover evidence of its
own wrongdoing, in essence, has created a litigation roadmap for
any disgruntled shareholder or employee looking for a potential
payday.2"
a corporation. Thomas E. Holliday & Charles J. Stevens, Disclosure of Results of Internal
Investigations to the Government or Other Third Parties, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
SECTION OF LITIGATION, INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 279, 287 (Brad D. Brian &
Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003).
17. See Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 7-8.
18. See id. at 8.
19. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 12, at 4-3. By fulfilling this basic obligation, corporate
directors may take great strides towards restoring public trust and confidence. See id.
20. Although not a problem in theory, internal investigations may lead to a range of
additional questions that a corporation's directors must address.
21. See Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 291-92. Significantly, a corporation that is
the subject of an enforcement action is exposing itself to potentially ruinous civil and financial
penalties.
22. See id. at 291.
23. See Sue Reisinger, Corporate Privilege in Fraud Cases Is at Stake: Much Rides on a
9th Circuit Decision, NATL L.J., Apr. 21, 2003, at Al.
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Historically, courts have developed a number of mechanisms for
keeping sensitive information confidential during the litigation
process, including the attorney-client and work product privileges.
There is a surprising lack of consensus, however, as to which theory,
if any, is most effective for a corporation in the context of an
internal investigation. Essentially, the problem boils down to
whether a corporation waives its ability to keep an internal
investigation confidential after voluntarily turning over the results
to government enforcement agencies.24 Considered in the contempo-
rary context of increased public scrutiny and oversight, this
question is more pressing than ever.25 This Note will argue that, in
light of the increasing pressure on corporations to cooperate with
government agencies, as well as the significant expansion in
investigative agencies and tactics, federal courts should give greater
protections to the results of internal investigations that corporations
disclose to a government agency voluntarily. In fact, the public's
interest in holding corporations accountable for keeping their shops
in order will be better served by establishing proactive incentives for
internal investigations through the creation of a formal self-
evaluative privilege for corporations that disclose the results of their
investigation voluntarily.
This Note will address the arguments both for and against
establishing a formal self-evaluative privilege in this context.
Through the lens of United States v. Bergonzi,26 Section I examines
the federal courts' traditional approach to the confidentiality of
internal investigations that are disclosed voluntarily. This Part
relies on the facts of an ongoing criminal fraud prosecution to
demonstrate both the shortcomings and consequences of the
prevailing judicial treatment of corporations that disclose the
results of an internal investigation to a government agency. Part II
assesses the motivations, risks, and benefits of corporate internal
investigations. Part III considers two recognized evidentiary
privileges, namely, the attorney-client and work product privileges,
that corporations often invoke in an attempt to protect the results
of internal investigations. As this Part demonstrates, neither
24. See id.
25. See id. at A7.
26. 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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privilege provides sufficient protection for an internal investigation
that a corporation discloses voluntarily to a government agency.
Finally, Part IV introduces the concept of the self-evaluative
privilege as a more appropriate response to this issue. As this Part
demonstrates, the self-evaluative privilege, although controversial
and not widely recognized, strikes the perfect balance between
protecting the confidentiality of sensitive corporate information and
promoting the public interest in full and fair disclosure of the
information required for effective government oversight.
I. THE DILEMMA OF DISCLOSURE: UNITED STATES V. BERGONZI
Perhaps more notably than any case in recent memory, the order
from the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California in United States v. Bergonzi27 highlights the pervasive
problems with maintaining the confidentiality of corporate internal
investigations that are submitted to government agencies volun-
tarily. Described as a "corporate fraud case that has everything-
federal indictments of corporate officers, a securities investiga-
tion, federal and state class actions, individual shareholder suits,
employee suits and derivative suits,"28 Bergonzi illustrates the
prevailing judicial response to the question of whether a corporation
waives the protections of the attorney-client and work product
privileges if it voluntarily turns over the results of an internal
investigation to government investigators who signed a confidential-
ity agreement.29 According to Judge Martin J. Jenkins, the answer,
quite simply, is yes.3"
In order to realize the full implication of this decision, it is
necessary to understand the case's convoluted background.31
Although the immediate controversy stems from the Department of
27. See id. at 493 (finding that "communications between client and attorney for the
purpose of relaying communication to a third party is [sic] not confidential and not protected
by the attorney-client privilege").
28. Reisinger, supra note 23, at Ai.
29. See Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 495; see also Reisinger, supra note 23, at Ai.
30. See Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 502 (granting Defendant's motion for the production of a
corporation's internal investigation report); Reisinger, supra note 23, at Al.
31. For an extensive factual account of the accounting irregularities and proposed merger,
see Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *7-*8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000).
1142 [Vol. 46:1137
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Justice's (DOJ) indictment of two HBO & Company (HBOC)
executives for securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud, 2 the full
story begins with the McKesson Corporation's (McKesson) decision
to acquire HBOC. 3
On October 17, 1998, McKesson entered into a stock-for-stock
merger agreement with HBOC.34 The agreement eventually grew
into a flat-out acquisition, with HBOC emerging as McKesson's
wholly-owned subsidiary. 5 Beginning on April 28, 1999, the newly
created corporation" announced a series of financial restatements
due to pervasive accounting irregularities on the part of HBOC.37
Initially, the corporation identified $42 million in improperly
recorded revenue.38 As its audits continued through July 1999,
McKesson HBOC reduced its revenues by $327.4 million for the
three fiscal years prior to the merger.39 In response to this an-
nouncement, the value of McKesson HBOC's shares fell from $65 to
$34 within twenty-four hours, and the company's market value
decreased by almost $9 billion.4°
The legal response to McKesson HBOC's financial restatement
was nothing short of staggering. In addition to the initiation of
32. Reisinger, supra note 23, at A7; see Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 490.
33. See Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 490; Ash, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *4-*5. According
to a pending lawsuit, "HBOC, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Atlanta before the
merger, provides computer software and technology solutions to the healthcare industry.
McKesson, a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Francisco, is primarily engaged in
the business of healthcare supply management." Id.
34. See Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 115 (Del. 2002). Specifically, the
terms provided that
McKesson would acquire HBOC in a tax-free, stock-for-stock merger then-valued
at approximately $14 billion. Under the terms of the agreement, HBOC would
merge with a McKesson acquisition subsidiary and HBOC shareholders would
receive 0.37 shares of McKesson common stock in exchange for each share of
HBOC common stock.
Ash, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *5.
35. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1253 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Saito, 806 A.2d at 115.
36. Under the terms of the agreement, "McKesson's name was changed to McKesson
HBOC and HBOC, now a wholly owned subsidiary of McKesson HBOC, became the combined
Company's health care information technology division." Ash, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *6.
37. See Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 490; Saito, 806 A.2d at 115.
38. See In re McKesson H-BOC, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1253.
39. See id. In total, "McKesson HBOC had to disallow $327.4 million of revenue and
$191.5 million of operating income." Ash, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *7.
40. See In re McKesson HBOC, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1253.
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investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the DOJ, McKesson was forced to address numerous allegations
of securities fraud.41 Although the full scope and impact of these
complaints remains to be determined, it is clear that they were
strong external incentives for McKesson HBOC to find out the
reasons behind their potentially ruinous restatements.
Accordingly, McKesson HBOC's Board of Directors took immedi-
ate steps to review the circumstances surrounding HBOC's actions.42
In May 1999, McKesson HBOC hired the law firm of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom to conduct an internal investigation, 43 and
entered into confidentiality agreements with the SEC and the
United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO).44 In July 1999, McKesson
HBOC voluntarily disclosed the results of its investigation to both
the SEC and USAO, including a memorandum on fifty-five inter
views conducted with thirty-seven present and former employees.45
After receiving the report, a federal grand jury "indicted the two
former co-presidents of HBOC on 17 counts of securities, mail and
wire fraud. 46 In addition, the SEC filed securities fraud charges
against HBOC's former General Counsel, Senior Vice President of
Finance, Chief Financial Officer, Senior Vice President of Sales and
two other financial officers.4 v In light of McKesson HBO C's complete
and extensive cooperation, both agencies declined to bring civil or
criminal actions against the corporation.48 In fact, "[i]n its 2001
policy statement, the SEC cited McKesson as an example of a
company that cooperated 49 with federal agencies.
41. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 490. In fact, "over seventy-five class action, derivative, and
individual lawsuits have been filed in connection with these events at McKesson HBOC." Ash,
2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *9.
42. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 490.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 490-91.
45. See id. at 491.
46. Reisinger, supra note 23, at A7; see also Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 490.
47. Reisinger, supra note 23, at A7.
48. See id.
49. Id. Significantly, the SEC filed an amicus brief in Bergonzi on behalf of McKesson
HBOC. See Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D 487. According to one attorney involved in the case, "[wihat
the United States cares about is the next case.... [and] being able to go to the next McKesson
and say, 'Look, if you give us this report ... we are not going to give it to the plaintiffs class
action lawyers who want it." See Reisinger, supra note 23, at A7 (quoting John H. Hemann,
the assistant U.S. attorney prosecuting the former HBOC executives).
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HBOC's former officers did not find McKesson HBOC's coopera-
tion to be such a positive development.' Not surprisingly, both co-
defendants in the DOJ's criminal prosecution, as well as all of the
former directors still under investigation by the SEC, have re-
quested access to the internal investigation.5' After hearing oral
arguments, the trial court ordered McKesson HBOC to release the
results of its investigation.52 Specifically, the court held that
"[a]lthough McKesson entered into what it fashions to be confidenti-
ality agreements with the Government entities involved ... the
production of the [internal investigation report] to ... the SEC
constituted waiver of the [work product] privilege."53 The court
disposed of McKesson HBOC's claim of attorney-client privilege by
ruling that "[b]y giving the Government, whether the SEC or the
USAO, full discretion to disclose the [internal investigation report]
in certain circumstances, the terms of the Agreements run counter
to the Company's assertion the communication was intended to
remain confidential."54
Unfortunately, McKesson HBOC's concerns with handing the
results of its internal investigation over to the defendants in
Bergonzi turned out to be appropriate. As a result of its ill-fated
acquisition, the company has been named as a defendant in more
than seventy-five private lawsuits.55 In addition, McKesson HBOC
is facing a federal class action lawsuit spearheaded by the New
York State Common Retirement Fund.5 Finally, McKesson HBOC
has also been targeted in a series of state lawsuits.57 If the decision
in Bergonzi is upheld, McKesson HBOC's alleged waiver of its
attorney-client and work product privileges could allow any number
of plaintiffs to access the results of its internal investigation. The
50. According to one attorney familiar with the case, McKesson HBOC's internal
investigation is "a clear-sailing road map as to exactly what happened and where the evidence
is and who the bad guys are." See id. (quoting Robert S. Plotkin, a partner with the
Washington office of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker).
51. See Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 493; Reisinger, supra note 23, at Al.
52. See Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 502.
53. Id. at 496-97.
54. Id. at 494.
55. Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000).
56. See generally In re McKesson HBOC Inc., Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
57. See Reisinger, supra note 23, at A7.
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impact of this decision on McKesson HBOC's market capitalization,
financial stability, and public reputation could be nothing short of
devastating.5" As a result, it is not surprising that the fallout from
this case has resonated throughout the corporate environment. As
the following Part demonstrates, the events surrounding the
decision in Bergonzi are emblematic of the difficult questions that
many corporations face when deciding to conduct an internal
investigation.
II. CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: ASKING THE DIFFICULT
QUESTIONS
The pressure on a corporation to conduct an internal investigation
can come from many different sources.59 For example, reactive
internal investigations are motivated in response to a discrete
action by a government agency, such as a grand jury subpoena,
document request, administrative audit, or law enforcement
activity.6° In contrast, proactive internal investigations are remedial
in nature and are organized in an attempt to avoid future adminis-
trative or law enforcement action.6' Regardless of the immediate
motivation, the prospect of an internal investigation presents a
corporation's directors with a number of difficult questions.
58. Currently, McKesson HBOC is the sixteenth largest corporation in the United States,
Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 5, 2004, at Fl, with 2004 revenues of
$69.5 billion. Press Release, McKesson HBOC, McKesson Reports Fiscal 2004 Fourth
Quarter and Full Year Results (Apr. 29, 2004), at http://www.mckesson.com/releases/2004/
042904_241205923.htm. In a quarterly report filed with the SEC on February 13, 2003,
McKesson HBOC reported that it could not
predict or determine the outcome or resolution of the accounting litigation
proceedings, or to estimate the amounts of, or potential range of, loss with
respect to those proceedings.... The range of possible resolutions of these
proceedings could include judgments against the Company or settlements that
could require substantial payments by the Company, which could have a
material adverse impact on McKesson's financial position, results of operations
and cash flows.
McKesson HBOC, Form 10-Q, Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, For Quarter Ended December 31,.2002 (Feb. 13, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/927653/000095014903000297/
f87627e10vq.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
59. See Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 6-8.
60. See id. at 5; Mulroy & Mufioz, supra note 9, at 49.
61. See Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 5; Mulroy & Mufioz, supra note 9, at 49.
1146 [Vol. 46:1137
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A. Deciding to Conduct an Internal Investigation
Initially, the most difficult choice facing a corporation's
directors is whether to undertake an internal investigation at all.
Understandably, directors have no liberty to avoid undertaking an
investigation if an enforcement agency requests information.63 In
contrast, proactive investigations always present a corporation with
the temptation to avoid asking challenging questions.64
B. Deciding to Disclose the Results of an Internal Investigation
Once a corporation addresses the threshold question of whether
to conduct an internal investigation, its directors must then decide
if it should disclose the results.6" As a general matter, corporations
lack an affirmative duty to report evidence of wrongdoing.66 Despite
this fact, however, corporations are still faced with significant
regulatory and policy incentives to disclose the results of an internal
investigation. For example, corporations in highly regulated
industries might have a duty to submit an investigative report as
part of their statutory reporting requirements.67
Even if a corporation is not under a statutory obligation to
disclose, voluntary disclosure to a federal enforcement agency can
62. See Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 6.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 6.7.
65. Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 281.
66. Although a corporation is not required "to report knowledge of criminal conduct ... or
to disclose evidence of that conduct voluntarily," it may not make a partial or misleading
disclosure of any improper activity discovered by an internal investigation. Id. (footnote
omitted).
67. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 12, at 11-4; Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 283.
Although the full range of federal reporting requirements is beyond the scope of this Note, a
few examples might prove informative. The Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986 "requires
government contractors to report in writing to the Inspector General of the contracting agency
whenever there are 'reasonable grounds' to believe that a kickback may have occurred
between upper- and lower-tier government contractors." Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16,
at 283 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 57 (2000)). Also, "states may impose broad disclosure obligations
upon government contractors." Id. at 283. In addition, federally insured banks are obligated
to submit written reports to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency if "there is cause
to believe that the bank has been defrauded." Id. Furthermore, public corporations "are
subject to the disclosure requirements of the federal securities statutes and rules." Id. at 283-
84.
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produce significant positive results as a matter of corporate policy.
As an initial matter, the duty to investigate, and potentially to
report, allegations of corporate wrongdoing stems from the directors'
fiduciary duty to the shareholders and their implied duty to inform
themselves of corporate activities.68 Accordingly, the primary benefit
that a corporation's directors may realize from an internal investiga-
tion is to prevent a breach of their fiduciary duty.6 9 At the same
time, internal investigations can allow corporations to improve their
financial performance by deterring future misconduct v and to
restore the public's trust by demonstrating the company's
integrity.7 In addition, reporting the results of an internal investi-
gation may convince the government not to prosecute or may
demonstrate that federal allegations of impropriety may be
unfounded. 2 Finally, corporations that prepare an internal
investigation will, at a minimum, have a chance to undertake
proactive preparation for litigation, 3 to control access to informa-
tion, and to create a formal response strategy. 4
68. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 12, at 11-3.
69. See generally Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Par Pharm., Inc.
Derivative Litig., 750 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Directors who ignore the responsibility
to investigate potential wrongdoing risk exposing themselves to shareholder derivative
actions attacking their decision. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 12, at 11-4. The fact that, "[i]n
the context of a derivative action, a written report [of an internal investigation] may be used
as evidence in support of a motion by the board of directors to terminate a lawsuit," illustrates
the protection that directors can afford themselves and their corporation simply by initiating
an internal investigation. Edwin G. Schallert & Natalie R. Williams, Report of the
Investigation, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 337.
70. See Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 292.
71. Id. at 287.
72. See Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 337. In other words, reporting the results
of an internal investigation provides "tangible evidence that ... corrective action is under way,"
which "may forestall a more intrusive government investigation." Id. Initially, this reporting
includes "bring[ing] exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor's attention, ... articulat[ing] the
corresponding legal defenses, and ... correct[ing] errors or misunderstandings on the part of
the investigators reporting to the prosecutor." Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 288. In
truth, there is still considerable disagreement about the real benefits to be ralized in this
area. According to one group of practitioners, "[t]his theory ... is articulated by government
lawyers more often than it is proven correct," and "any pre-indictment presentation that
implicitly concedes guilt serves only to convince the prosecutor that prosecution is warranted."
Id. at 287-88.
73. See Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 288.
74. See Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 7.
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There are, however, significant risks in conducting an internal
investigation. Initially, disclosing the results of an internal investi-
gation to federal enforcement agencies may produce a wide variety
of unintended consequences.75 Accordingly, "the results of an
investigation conducted as part of a good faith effort to respond to,
investigate, and resolve an internal company problem could ...
establish civil or criminal liability of the corporation, its officers, or
its directors."76 In addition, disclosure of an internal investigation's
results may produce a "chilling effect" on employees who would
otherwise be willing to participate in an investigation stemming
from a fear of personal criminal liability or a threat to their
permanent employment."
The most serious consideration, however, involves the corpora-
tion's ultimate ability to keep the results privileged in subsequent
litigation. The question of whether a corporation waives its ability
to keep an internal investigation confidential after turning over the
results to government enforcement agencies is one that federal
courts are not doctrinally equipped to address. Although some
courts have displayed a willingness to keep the results of an
internal investigation confidential,78 a corporation that decides to
undertake an internal investigation faces the real possibility that
the "[piroduction of a report to a government agency may result in
the loss of all legal privileges associated with preparing the
report."79 The following Part will discuss the extent to which courts
have struggled with this issue of confidentiality. Unfortunately, the
mix of approaches taken by the federal courts has not provided
adequate guidance for corporations trying to decide whether to
disclose the results of an internal investigation.
75. See Mulroy & Mufioz, supra note 9, at 49. Specifically, this decision "can lead to
unforeseen and undesirable third-party actions, criminal prosecutions, or civil enforcement
actions by government agencies against the corporation." Id.
76. Id. According to one assessment, "[e]ven if not used directly, the information may
provide the government or opposing parties with a virtual road map of leads, such as names
of witnesses and the existence of documents containing relevant information" or, at the very
least, compromise a corporation's ultimate litigation strategy. See Holliday & Stevens, supra
note 16, at 291.
77. See Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 291.
78. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
79. See Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 337.
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III. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO PROTECTING THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE
As Bergonzi demonstrates, corporations that volunteer the results
of an internal investigation to a federal agency face the bleak
prospect of waiving the report's confidentiality in all future
proceedings.80 At present, corporations are generally limited to
relying on the protections offered by the attorney-client privilege
and work product privilege in order to keep the results of their
internal investigations confidential. Although these established
privileges generally serve the same purpose, there is a difference in
the scope of their applicability, which stems from their divergent
policy goals."1 Initially, the attorney-client privilege developed as an
attempt to promote justice by protecting the attorney-client
relationship. 2 At the same time, the work product privilege
developed as a means of maintaining an adversarial system of
justice.8 3 As the following sections demonstrate, courts have applied
both privileges extensively in the context of corporate internal
investigations, often with mixed results.
80. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
81. As stated by one court,
[t]he purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full disclosure of
information between an attorney and his client by guarantying the inviolability
of their confidential communications. The "work product of the attorney," on the
other hand, is accorded protection for the purpose of preserving our adversary
system of litigation by assuring an attorney that his private files shall, except
in unusual circumstances, remain free from the encroachments of opposing
counsel.
Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
82. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
83. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947). Specifically,
the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of
preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our
system of legal procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that
privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify production through a subpoena
or court order.
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A. The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
In practice, the attorney-client privilege is still the primary
evidentiary tool for maintaining the confidentiality of privileged
documents.8 4 Some commentators have argued that this privilege
should be disfavored, because it creates unnecessary costs for the
judicial system without producing any additional candor between
attorneys and clients.' The Supreme Court, however, has recog-
nized the attorney-client privilege as "the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law." 8 In
theory, the attorney-client privilege appears to be an enticingly
simple tool to protect the confidentiality of an internal investigation.
In practice, however, its application in a corporate setting presents
a number of difficult issues.
1. Identifying the Corporate Client
As an initial matter, courts have established that corporations
may enjoy the benefits of the attorney-client relationship with its
retained legal counsel.8 7 Although corporations receive the same
confidentiality guarantees as individuals,' the privilege protects
84. Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Implications of the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work-Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 20.
Traditionally, the attorney-client privilege attaches to a communication if
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made ... in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed ... for the purpose of securing primarily either
(i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services ... and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. (quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950)); see also WEBB ET AL., supra note 12, at 6-3.
85. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 218 (1993); see also William H. Simon,
Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 127, 142-45 (2004).
86. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. As such, the privilege serves a critical purpose, "to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice." Id.
87. See, e.g., id. at 389-90.
88. Mulroy & Mufioz, supra note 9, at 51.
20041 1151
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
only communications between an attorney and his client.89 In
addition, there is still considerable disagreement as to which agents
represent the corporation in a sufficient capacity to have their
communication protected." As there is no per se rule, the existence
of the corporate attorney-client privilege must be determined on a
case-by-case basis.91
In light of this discretionary approach, Upjohn v. United States
has become the gold standard for identifying the client in the
corporation-attorney relationship. 2 In Upjohn, the Court rejected a
restrictive "control group"93 test that would limit the attorney-client
privilege to "communications between counsel and upper-echelon...
management."94 Apparently, the Court's reasoning rested upon the
assumption that, in the context of corporate internal investigations,
it will frequently be employees beyond... "officers and agents...
responsible for directing [the company's] actions in response to
legal advice" ... who will possess the information needed by the
corporation's lawyers. Middle-level-and indeed lower-
level-employees can, by actions within the scope of their
employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties,
and it is only natural that these employees would have the
relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is
adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or
potential difficulties.95
Accordingly, Upjohn protects communication between an employee
and a corporation's attorney when the communication takes place
89. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96. In the context of corporate internal investigations,
this protection does not extend to any facts or other information uncovered during the course
of the investigation. See id.
90. See id. at 391-92.
91. See id. at 396.
92. See Mulroy & Mufloz, supra note 9, at 51. This decision is even more notable as it
evaluated the "applicability of the attorney-client privilege in connection with an internal
corporate investigation." Id. at 51-52.
93. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397.
94. Mulroy & Mufioz, supra note 9, at 52.
95. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391. In light of the purpose behind the attorney-client privilege,
the control group test "cannot, consistent with 'the principles of the common law as ...
interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience,' govern the development of the law in this
area." Id. at 397 (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. Ev. 501).
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during an internal investigation.96 Although Upjohn appears to
shield a corporation's internal investigations, lower courts have not
followed the decision universally, and it remains the subject of
considerable interpretation.97
2. Defining Corporate Legal Services
In addition to the difficulties with identifying the corporate client,
courts have also struggled with questions relating to the appropriate
definition of corporate legal services. In general, a qualified attorney
acting principally as a lawyer must perform the legal services in
question in order for the attorney-client privilege to attach.98 In the
corporate context, however, internal investigations raise questions
as to whether an attorney has been employed to perform legal or
business services.99 As the privilege's protection does not apply to
non-legal communications,"0 the fact that corporations commonly
employ attorneys to provide a mixed product of theoretical legal
doctrine and pragmatic business advice can present a conceptual
96. Mulroy & Mufioz, supra note 9, at 53. The Court looked to a variety of factors to
determine whether the attorney-client privilege applied, including whether
(1) the interviews occurred at the direction of corporate counsel; (2) employee
communications were made to corporate counsel acting as such; (3) the
information sought was not available from "control group" management; (4) the
communications were within the scope of the employees' duties; and (5) the
employees were aware that they were being questioned in order for the
corporation to secure legal advice.
Id. In general, lower federal courts have determined that the attorney-client privilege exists
without finding the presence of all of the Upjohn factors. See id. at 49.
97. See id. at 53. Significantly, "Upjohn may not necessarily apply in diversity proceedings
where the federal court ... is obligated to use state privilege law, which could vary from state
to state." Id. at 54. In addition,
Upjohn is not binding upon state courts. In fact, according to one recent survey,
only fourteen states (either through judicial decision or legislative enactment)
have adopted Upjohn's rule on corporate attorney-client privilege, eight states
have adopted the 'control group' test, and the remaining states have not
definitively decided on a particular approach.
Id. For a specific listing of Upjohn's treatment at the state level, see id. at 54 n.34.
98. See id. at 56. In other words, an attorney must "be involved not only in investigating
the facts, but also in formulating and rendering legal advice and opinion." Id.
99. See Block & Barton, supra note 84, at 29.
100. See id.
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conflict. 1 ' Accordingly, courts will only protect this mixed communi-
cation if it is predominately legal in nature.0 2
The leading authority on corporate legal services remains
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.113 In Meredith, the Court
stated that "[i]t is not easy to frame a definite test for distinguishing
legal from nonlegal advice."' 4 They continued to find, however, that
a matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima facie
so committed for the sake of the legal advice which may be more
or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is therefore
within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in
aspects requiring legal advice."0 5
In the context of an internal investigation, this standard has been
applied to mean that referring the matter to a professional legal
advisor is prima facie evidence that the matter was committed for
the purpose of securing legal advice.0 6 This restriction, however,
can be problematic for attorneys retained for their participation in
"advising and assisting the corporation with financial, business,
technical, or human resource issues."07 Some commentators have
argued that a corporation should not have to forfeit the attorney-
client privilege because its attorneys will invariably have additional
business-related obligations.0 8 This debate highlights the persistent
101. See id. at 30.
102. See id.
103. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). For an extensive discussion of Meredith, see Schallert
& Williams, supra note 69, at 341-42.
104. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 610 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2296 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).
105. Id.
106. Id. As stated in Meredith,
[i]n applying this standard, the Court stated that the matter was committed to
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, a professional legal adviser. Thus, it was prima
facie committed for the sake of legal advice and was, therefore, within the
privilege absent a clear showing to the contrary. No such showing was made.
Rather, the December report contained communications which were uniquely
legal.
Id. (emphasis added).
107. Mulroy & Mufioz, supra note 9, at 57.
108. Id. A few courts have endorsed this position, finding that
[tihe modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon not only what is
permissible but also what is desirable. And it is in the public interest that the
lawyer should regard himself as more than predicter of legal consequences. His
1154
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questions about the scope of protections offered by the attorney-
client privilege in maintaining an internal investigation's confidenti-
ality.
B. The Corporate Work Product Privilege
In addition to the attorney-client privilege, corporations fre-
quently invoke the work product privilege in an attempt to keep the
results of an internal investigation confidential. 09 Significantly, this
privilege protects all materials prepared in anticipation of litigation,
whether prepared by an attorney, a party to the litigation, or a
party's agent." ' In general, the work product privilege focuses
primarily on protecting an attorney's opinions and legal theories, as
opposed to the underlying facts."' Regardless of whether the
material is ordinary work product or opinion work product, however,
it must be prepared in anticipation of litigation in order to remain
privileged."1 2
Although the privilege is firmly established, courts are cognizant
of the special considerations that an internal corporate investigation
presents. In fact, "[m]ost courts have recognized that once the
suspicion of wrongdoing rises to the level where an internal
investigation is commissioned, litigation is virtually inevitable,
duty to society as well as to his client involves many relevant social, economic,
political and philosophical considerations. And the privilege of nondisclosure is
not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in
a communication which also includes legal advice.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
109. The work product privilege is a common law evidentiary rule codified in federal
procedural rules. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3).
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
111. See Block & Barton, supra note 84, at 49. This differential protection provides that
"[in ordering discovery of [work product] materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). On the other hand, "ordinary work product, inherently
factual in nature" receives less protection. Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 345.
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); see also, e.g., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512 (stating that "the
general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation is so well
recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a
burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to
justify production through a subpoena or court order').
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particularly where the investigation confirms wrongdoing." '113 In
spite of this unique realization, maintaining the confidentiality of
sensitive corporate information under the work product privilege
remains far from guaranteed. As Bergonzi demonstrates, the
protections that the attorney-client privilege and work product
privilege offer have not held up in the highly specialized context of
internal investigations submitted voluntarily to government
agencies."'
C. Waiver of the Traditional Privileges
On the surface, it appears that corporations may be able to secure
some degree of protection from these established evidentiary
privileges. The benefits to be realized from the collective application
of these privileges, however, may be more appealing in theory than
in practice. As applied, it remains unclear whether either privilege
can keep confidential the results of an internal investigation that a
corporation has submitted voluntarily to a federal enforcement
agency." 5 According to the doctrine espoused in Bergonzi, once the
material in an internal investigation has been submitted voluntarily
to a government agency, then the protections offered by the
attorney-client and work product privileges may be waived as to
other potential litigants. 16
1. Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Although a corporation can waive an investigation's privileged
status in a number of ways,'17 one specific scenario is particularly
problematic for corporations attempting to cooperate with govern-
ment agencies. Initially, a voluntary disclosure of confidential
information to a third party generally waives the attorney-client
113. Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 344. For cases that follow this view of internal
investigations, see id. at 344 n.24.
114. See supra Part I.
115. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
116. See Block & Barton, supra note 84, at 63-64.
117. See generally id. at 63-81 (discussing scenarios in which a corporation can waive the
privileged status of an internal investigation).
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and work product privileges as to all other parties.1 ' Accordingly,
the disclosure of confidential information to a federal agency will
usually waive the privilege for all future cases regarding commu-
nication on the same subjects, especially if the disclosure took
place during the course of an investigation or administrative
proceeding.119 Although this precedent is firmly established, several
federal circuits have declined to adopt a per se rule that every
voluntary production by a corporate client waives the attorney-client
and work product privileges.'20 Significantly, courts have split about
the impact of inadvertent disclosure on an internal investigation's
privileged status. 2' Although some courts find that the simple act
of disclosure waives the privilege,'22 others hold that the privilege
is not waived absent some intention to waive on the part of the
corporation. 123
2. Waiver of the Work Product Privilege
The issues with respect to waiver of a corporation's work product
privilege are significantly different than those involving waiver of
the attorney-client privilege.124 In general, courts have held that not
all voluntary disclosures waive the work product privilege.'25 Courts
look to a variety of factors in determining when a corporation has
waived its work product privilege, including whether
118. See PaineWebber Group, Inc. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P'ship, 187 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir.
1999).
119. Block & Barton, supra note 84, at 64. For a representative listing of judicial treatment
of this issue, see id. at 64 n. 194. Although voluntary disclosure by corporate clients is limited
to those individuals with sufficient authority to bind the corporation through their actions,
it is still clearly established that corporations may lose the protections of the attorney-client
and work product privileges. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343, 348-49 (1985).
120. See, e.g., In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993).
121. See Block & Barton, supra note 84, at 74.
122. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979) (finding that "[an intent to waive one's privilege is not
necessary for such a waiver to occur").
123. See, e.g., United States v. United Techs. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108, 116 (D. Conn. 1997)
(considering a number of factors in determining whether inadvertent disclosure should be a
waiver of privilege).
124. See Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 294.
125. See In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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(1) "the party claiming the privilege seeks to use it in a way that
is not consistent with the purpose of the privilege," (2) appel-
lants had no reasonable basis for believing that the disclosed
materials would be kept confidential ... and (3) waiver of the
privilege in these circumstances would not trench on any policy
elements now inherent in this privilege.126
At first blush, it appears that the work product privilege may offer
corporations a substantial degree of protection against waiving the
confidentiality of an internal investigation. It is important to
remember, however, that this privilege applies only if the material
is prepared in anticipation of litigation.127 Although many courts
have shown a willingness to assume that all internal investigations
are prepared in anticipation of litigation,12 s there is still consider-
able debate on this subject.
3. Extent of a Corporation's Waiver
Once a corporation waives the privileged status of an internal
investigation, courts face significant questions about the extent of
the waiver.129 In general, voluntary disclosure of a communication
to one party means an absolute and complete waiver to all parties. 130
In contrast, some courts are willing to recognize a limited waiver of
confidentiality.131 Under this approach courts have been willing to
126. See id. (citation omitted) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir.
1982)). The factors for finding a waiver of the work product privilege have also been described
as
whether the party claiming the privilege seeks to use it in a way that is not
consistent with the purpose of the privilege[;J ... whether waiver of the privilege
in the circumstances would tread on policy elements inherent in the privilege;
whether the party had a reasonable basis for believing that the disclosed
materials would be kept confidential by the governmental agency to which
disclosure was made; and whether the disclosure was voluntary or involuntary.
Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 294.
127. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. Accordingly, "[g]iven the uncertainty in the law and the flexibility of tests that courts
have applied to waiver issues, it is impossible for company counsel to guarantee that the
company's investigation report and materials will remain privileged." Holliday & Stevens,
supra note 16, at 294.
130. Id. at 292-93.
131. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977).
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disclose specific parts of an internal investigation while protecting
any information not actually disclosed. '32 Although courts have
recognized this type of waiver only in limited situations, those that
do so have based their decision on important public policy consider-
ations, "such as facilitating the settlement of litigation, permitting
full cooperation among joint defendants, expediting discovery and
encouraging voluntary disclosure to regulatory agencies. 133 In
essence, the selective waiver approach recognizes the potential
negative effect that "a doctrine of total waiver [of privilege] would
have on corporate cooperation in voluntary disclosure programs. 134
IV. No TIME LIKE THE PRESENT: A SELF-EVALUATIVE PRIVILEGE
FOR CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
As demonstrated by the dilemma facing McKesson HBOC, the
importance of maintaining an internal investigation's confidential-
ity can hardly be overstated.135 At the same time, the protections
offered by the traditional attorney-client and work product privi-
leges have not held up under judicial review.136 When faced with
the competing priorities of cooperating with federal enforcement
agencies and protecting the corporation from the untimely disclo-
sure of sensitive information, directors and managers confront
significant disincentives to adopting proactive, self-evaluative
governance strategies. The prominent corporate scandals over the
past several years clearly demonstrate that this environment is
unsatisfactory for regulators and unsettling for investors.
132. See, e.g., id.
133. In re Martin Marietta Corp. v. United States, 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988).
134. See Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 353. Although selective waiver would seem
particularly well-suited in the context of a corporate internal investigation, "[tihe weight of
authority indicates that such cases are fairly rare exceptions to the general rule of waiver."
Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 293. Accordingly, most courts reject the doctrine,
because it creates "risks of encouraging tactical selective disclosure by corporations while
offering speculative benefits." Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 353. For a complete
listing of the differential treatment of selective waiver by federal courts, see Block & Barton,
supra note 84, at 66 n.203.
135. As asserted by one author, "it is through this Scylla of huge damage awards and
Charybdis of governmental regulatory schemes that companies must navigate to avoid
devastating financial losses or criminal inquiries." Donald P. Vandegrift, Jr., The Privilege of
Self-Critical Analysis: A Survey of the Law, 60 ALB. L. REv. 171, 172 (1996).
136. See, e.g., supra Part III.
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A. A Nascent Solution: Development of the Self-Evaluative
Privilege
Unfortunately, federal courts have failed to embrace conclusively
a developing privilege that serves the important public interests of
promoting responsible corporate "self-policing" while protecting
corporations from the financial impacts of continuous litigation."7
The self-evaluative privilege'38 has developed in order to protect
"documents that reflect an organization's internal self-analysis or
self-evaluation"'39 from public disclosure. In addition,
[t]he privilege protects an organization or individual from the
Hobson's choice of aggressively investigating accidents or
possible regulatory violations, ascertaining the causes and
results, and correcting any violations or dangerous conditions,
but thereby creating a self-incriminating record that may be
evidence of liability, or deliberately avoiding making a record on
the subject (and possibly leaving the public exposed to danger)
in order to lessen the risk of civil liability.""
Although the self-evaluative privilege extends only to "subjective
opinions, impressions and recommendations," it still presents a
workable and preferable alternative to the use of existing
privileges."'
As with the historical development of other recognized
privileges,142 the self-evaluative privilege stems from a desire to
further the important public interests in "encouraging institutional
self-policing"'43 and to avoid "the chilling effect ... from complete
137. Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 343.
138. This privilege is also known as the privilege of self-critical evaluation, self-evaluation
privilege, or privilege of critical self-evaluation. See JEROME G. SNIDER & HOWARD A. ELLINS,
CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 6-1 n.1 (Release 7, 2003).
139. Id.; see also, e.g., Todd v. S. Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152 F.R.D. 676, 682 (D.N.J. 1993).
140. Vandegrift, supra note 135, at 176 (quoting Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157
F.R.D. 522, 524 (N.D. Fla. 1994)).
141. SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 138, at 6-5.
142. "Privileges have historically been recognized when, as is true in the case of self-critical
analysis, the public interest weighs heavily in favor of confidentiality." Note, The Privilege of
Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1983).
143. Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 346.
1160 [Vol. 46:1137
2004] NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED? 1161
disclosure. ' 144 This nascent privilege is based on the assumption
that disclosing an organization's self-evaluation will create incen-
tives that are contrary to society's interests in promoting greater
compliance with the law.'45 Since its initial recognition in 1970,146
lower federal courts have upheld the privilege in a variety of
contexts, including internal reviews of hiring policies, 147 products
liability,14 employment safety, 149 environmental audits, 5 ° libel,'
and securities litigation.'52 In addition, commentators have argued
for expanding the privilege to NCAA investigative files,'53 affirma-
tive action plans,' and health care fraud and abuse investiga-
tions.
15
Despite these persuasive arguments, most state and federal
courts do not recognize the self-evaluative privilege as an inde-
pendent means for protecting confidential information.' As a
common law privilege without statutory underpinnings, courts have
144. SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 138, at 6-2 (quoting Todd v. S. Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152
F.R.D. 676, 682 (D.N.J. 1993)). The "self-evaluation privilege is designed to encourage parties
to 'engage in candid self-evaluation without fear that such criticism will later be used against
them.'" Mulroy & Mufioz, supra note 9, at 59 (quoting Reich v. Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp.
367, 371 (D.N.J. 1994).
145. SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 138, at 6-5 (quoting Sheppard v. Consol. Edison Co., 893
F. Supp. 6, 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
146. For a complete listing of the contexts in which the self-evaluative privilege has been
recognized, see SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 138, at 6-2 nn.5-9.
147. See Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283, 284-85 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
148. See Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1992).
149. See Granger v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
150. See Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 527 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
151. See Lasky v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 5 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1366, 1367 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
152. See In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
153. See generally Kevin MacGillivray, The Confidentiality of NCAA Investigation Files: A
Policy Worthy of Protection, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 629 (1998) (arguing for the extension
of the self-evaluative privilege to NCAA investigations of rules violations by student athletes).
154. See generally Note, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and Discovery of Affirmative
Action Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1984) (demonstrating the need for a self-
critical analysis privilege to protect affirmative action plans in employment discrimination
suits).
155. See generally Gabriel L. Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations,
Whistleblower Concerns: Techniques to Protect Your Health Care Organization, 51 ALA. L. REV.
205 (1999) (presenting the need for a self-evaluative privilege to protect health care providers
during a fraud and abuse investigation).
156. SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 138, at 6-3. For examples of the negative treatment
afforded the self-evaluative privilege, see id. at 6-3 nn.11-12.
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recognized self-evaluation, at best, on a case-by-case basis.157
Whether due to "the suspicion that 'many internal probes are really
velvet-coated cover-ups ''15 ' or the general reluctance toward
recognizing new evidentiary privileges, 159 most federal courts have
failed to clarify the privilege's scope or contours.
60
Courts faced with a claim of self-evaluative privilege have
typically balanced the private interests of the party seeking
protection against the "public interest in maintaining confidential-
ity."1 '' In order to be protected by the self-evaluative privilege, the
prevailing test requires that:
(1) the information must result from a critical self-analysis
undertaken by the party seeking protection; (2) the public must
have a strong interest in preserving the free flow of the type of
information sought; (3) the information must be of a type the
flow of which would be curtailed if discovery were allowed; and
(4) the information must have been prepared with the expecta-
tion that it would be kept confidential, and must have in fact
been kept confidential. 62
Perhaps more importantly, courts that have recognized this
privilege acknowledge that it is grounded in the idea that "confiden-
tiality is often essential to the free flow of information and that the
free flow of information is essential to promote recognized public
interests.16 3
157. See Note, supra note 154, at 428-29.
158. Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 343 n.22 (quoting Fred Strasser, Dicey
Dilemmas: Corporate Probe Use Expanding, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 9, 1989, at 1).
159. See Vandegrift, supra note 135, at 174. "Judicial apprehension about a broad self-
criticism privilege may stem from the Supreme Court's admonitions against the expansion
of existing, and the creation of new, privilege doctrines." Schallert & Williams, supra note 69,
at 348.
160. See SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 138, at 6-4.
161. Id. at 6-6.
162. Id.; see also Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992)
(establishing the most widely applied test for the recognition of a self-evaluative privilege).
163. Note, supra note 154, at 1087; see also Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.
1970) (recognizing the existence of the self-evaluative privilege in protecting a hospital's
internal risk management process). As stated by one commentator, the self-evaluative
privilege is a reasonable alternative for situations in which "denying protection will stifle
more information than will applying the privilege." Note, supra note 142, at 1088.
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B. Making the Grade: Why Corporate Internal Investigations
Satisfy the Test for a Self-Evaluative Privilege
Although no court has expressly recognized a claim of self-
evaluative privilege for corporate internal investigations, some have
discussed its applicability in this context. 16 4 In fact, corporate
internal investigations, especially those that are motivated inter-
nally and provided proactively to federal enforcement agencies,
satisfy the required elements of the self-evaluative privilege better
than many of the situations in which courts have already recognized
its applicability. First, the information to which the privilege would
be applied is the result of a corporation's critical self-analysis.
Regardless of the motivation, the focus of an internal investigation
is, by definition, on a corporation's internal activities. Second, the
public has a strong interest in maintaining the free flow of internal
information from a corporation to the appropriate enforcement
agencies, as well as in avoiding the "chilling effect" on employee
cooperation that results from the strict disclosure approach.
165
Whether styled as self-policing, self-analysis, or self-governance,
enabling federal enforcement agencies to obtain the confidential
information they need to fulfill their oversight functions is an
important public interest that meets the requirements for recogni-
tion of the self-evaluative privilege. Third, the information con-
tained in internal investigations is, without a doubt, of a type that
would be discouraged in the face of complete discovery. As demon-
strated by McKesson HBOC's dilemma, the information contained
in internal investigations can have extremely damaging and
unforeseen consequences. Given the choice, it seems obvious that
allowing greater public discovery of this information can serve only
as a disincentive for corporations to conduct proactive fact-finding
activities. Finally, in the absence of a government mandate, internal
investigations are almost always prepared with the intention that
they will be kept confidential. The difficulty, however, comes in
satisfying the expectation that the investigation is actually kept
confidential.
164. Block & Barton, supra note 84, at 18-19 n.1.
165. Todd v. S. Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152 F.R.D. 676, 682 (D.N.J. 1993).
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Courts have been reluctant to grant a self-evaluative privilege to
corporations that share information with a government agency
pursuant to a formal request or subpoena, due to the lack of
confidentiality that such disclosure seems to entail.'66 In theory, the
self-evaluative privilege is waived only "if there is disclosure of the
results of the evaluation in a manner that would allow an adversary
to gain access to the information."'67 Under the facts in Bergonzi,
McKesson HBOC provided the DOJ with the results of their
internal investigation voluntarily and under the terms of a negoti-
ated confidentiality agreement."' 8 Accordingly, the corporation
clearly conducted its investigation with the intention that the
results would stay confidential and took voluntary steps to ensure
that the information would in fact remain so. It is hard to imagine
any other actions that McKesson HBOC could have taken to protect
the confidentiality of its information, short of denying the DOJ and
SEC access to the information and facing a formal investigation or
subpoena.'69 As a result, it is counterproductive and counterintuitive
for courts to deny the application of the self-evaluative privilege
when a corporation discloses its internal investigation in such a
confidential manner. In light of these arguments, it seems obvious
that corporations that voluntarily submit the results of an internal
investigation to a federal enforcement agency satisfy the elements
necessary for courts to recognize the protections of the self-
evaluative privilege.
C. No Time Like the Present: Why Corporations that Cooperate
Should Be Protected by a Self-Evaluative Privilege
The application of the self-evaluative privilege to corporate
internal investigations does more than merely satisfy a set of basic
structural formalities. Specifically, there are strong pragmatic and
policy arguments in favor of extending this privilege beyond its
166. See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding the self-
evaluative privilege inapplicable to documents requested by a government agency, as opposed
to a private party); see also SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 138, at 6-9.
167. SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 138, at 6-9 (emphasis added).
168. United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
169. Incidentally, either option would have waived the corporation's expectation of
confidentiality and denied it any protection from the self-evaluative privilege.
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traditional context. The following sections will examine these
arguments in greater detail.
1. A Convergence of Opinions
The first argument in favor of extending the self-evaluative
privilege to corporate internal investigations is that a surprising
number of governmental actors and agencies have already reached
an apparent convergence of opinion on this topic. For example, both
the executive and legislative branches of the federal government
have already recognized the desirability of this approach. In
addition, Delaware's Court of Chancery has started to demonstrate
a greater recognition of the benefits to be realized from a self-
evaluative privilege for corporate internal investigations. Perhaps
not surprisingly, it is the federal judiciary that remains out of step
with the prevailing views on this topic. Several examples may help
to further clarify these important developments.
As an initial matter, the final results of a corporation's internal
investigation will be of significant interest and usefulness to a
number of federal agencies. First, the SEC requires that all publicly
traded corporations include a wide variety of internal governance
information in their periodic filings."'7 This information includes, for
example, whether any member of a corporation's officers or directors
"is a named subject of a pending criminal proceeding"'' and
whether a corporation knows of any "trends or uncertainties that
have had or that the [corporation] reasonably expects will have a
material ... unfavorable impact" on its business.172 Second, the DOJ
can and will pursue formal investigations in order to ferret out
suspected corporate wrongdoing.'73 Interestingly, the threat of harm
to a publicly traded corporation's image, and therefore to the value
of its shares, from a DOJ investigation may be as much of a
motivation to perform an internal investigation as the issuance of
a formal indictment. When taken in conjunction with the DOJ's
shift to using search warrants and the attendant public spectacle, 174
170. See Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 284.
171. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(0(2) (2004).
172. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2004).
173. See supra text accompanying note 32.
174. Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 14.
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corporations may face pressure to conduct an internal investigation
from either formal or informal DOJ actions. Third, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) has well established reporting require-
ments and voluntary disclosure programs for corporations to use in
investigating their environmental footprints.175  Finally, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) continues to
increase the scope of its formal reporting requirements.176
A number of government agencies have already recognized the
sensitive and privileged nature of the information generated by an
internal investigation. Not surprisingly, many of these agencies
have created formal voluntary disclosure programs that may
effectively insulate a corporation from any additional criminal
sanctions. 77 The DOJ, Department of Defense (DOD), EPA, and
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) all have developed written guide-
lines for voluntary disclosure of a corporation's internal investiga-
tion.75 Clearly, these programs signal a strong commitment by
federal enforcement agencies to bypass prosecution for corporations
whose disclosure is truly voluntary and not developed in the face of
external pressure. 79
Perhaps the most important example of this federal commitment
to encouraging cooperation between corporations and enforcement
agencies is that the voluntary disclosure of sensitive information at
an early stage of government involvement will be taken into account
during any subsequent sentencing phases."S As applied, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations give considerable weight
to a corporation's decision to cooperate with federal investigators."1
175. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure,
Correction and Prevention of Violations, available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
resources/policies/incentives/auditing/auditpolicy.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
176. See, e.g., Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General,
Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399 (Oct. 30, 1998), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/selfdisclosure.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
177. Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 287.
178. For a representative listing of voluntary reporting programs developed by federal
agencies, see id. at 290 n.31.
179. Id. at 290.
180. See Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 7.
181. For an extensive account of the approach taken by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations toward a corporation's voluntary disclosure of its internal investigation, see
Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 288-89. The authors note that
[a]n organization's voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing tends to reduce its
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Specifically, if a corporation is actually guilty of the offense charged,
cooperation with federal enforcement agencies may cut the fines by
between eighty and ninety-five percent. '82 As such, "a decision not
to disclose carries with it substantial economic risks in the form of
a fine, as well as terms and conditions of probation.' 83 At the most
basic level, the potential to avoid severe financial liability and
statutory penalties provides significant incentives for corporations
to conduct and disclose the results of their internal investigations.'"
The existence of these voluntary disclosure programs already
creates a limited protection for corporate internal investigations in
practice, if not in theory. As demonstrated in Bergonzi, however,
these programs do not go far enough toward ensuring the confidenti-
ality of sensitive corporate information.
In addition to this movement by federal enforcement agencies
toward recognizing a self-evaluative privilege, Congress appears to
be following a similarly proactive approach to internal investiga-
tions. In fact, Congress's most recent legislation to address corpo-
rate governance in general, and internal investigations in particu-
lar, seems to favor a more tempered approach to corporate disclo-
sure. Initially, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act' 5 imposed a wide range of
reporting and disclosure requirements on corporations and their
directors." 6 At first blush these requirements may reflect nothing
more than a punitive approach to enforcing basic standards of
corporate governance. Recent legislation, however, moderates this
culpability score, and thus its multiplier and actual fine. More specifically, if
the organization: voluntarily discloses the offense to the government before
disclosure is threatened or a government investigation begins, fully cooperates in
the subsequent government investigation, and clearly recognizes and accepts
responsibility for its conduct before trial (i.e., pleads guilty), then five points will
be subtracted from the culpability score.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4(a) (1991)).
182. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 12, at 11-4.
183. See Holliday & Stevens, supra note 16, at 288.
184. See Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 7.
185. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
186. Brian & McNeil, supra note 10, at 2. For a discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's
reporting and disclosure requirements, see id. at 2 n.2. Although the full scope of the Act's
requirements is beyond this Note's boundaries, it is sufficient to state that Congress has
become more involved in resolving policy questions on promoting ethical corporate
governance.
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standard by providing publicly traded corporations with a limited
self-evaluative privilege.
Specifically, the Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor
Restitution Act of 2003 (SFDIRA)187 would provide an unprece-
dented degree of statutory protection for corporations that disclose
the results of an internal investigation to the SEC. As drafted, the
legislation would prohibit the waiver of a document's confidentiality
if a corporation shares information with the SEC.'88 The SFDIRA
would amend section twenty-four of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by inserting the following language:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever the
Commission and any person agree in writing to terms pursuant
to which such person will produce or disclose to the Commission
any document or information that is subject to any Federal or
State law privilege, or to the protection provided by the work
product doctrine, such production or disclosure shall not
constitute a waiver of the privilege or protection as to any person
other than the Commission.18
9
According to one of its sponsors, Congressman Michael G. Oxley, the
bill is designed "to strengthen the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to make it even more effective in deterring securities fraud and
enforcing securities statutes."'" Accordingly, the bill is intended not
only to "act [as ] a deterrent," but also "to restore some faith in the
process for investors who have plenty of education in the school of
hard knocks."''
Congressman Oxley's comments mirror the results of a report on
the SFDIRA conducted by the House of Representatives Committee
on Financial Services (Committee).'92 In their evaluation of the bill,
the Committee determined that the SFDIRA "would give the [SEC]
and banking regulators access to significant, otherwise unobtainable
187. The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179,
108th Cong. (2003).
188. Id. § 4.
189. Id.
190. Press Release, Congressman Richard H. Baker, Baker, Oxley Introduce Bill to
Strengthen SEC Powers Against Securities Fraud, Return Funds to Defrauded Investors (May
21, 2003), available at http://www.baker.house.gov/html/release.cfm?id=59.
191. Id.
192. H.R. REP. No. 108-475, pt. 1 (2004).
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information by allowing.., private parties to produce privileged or
work-product protected documents.., without waiving the privilege
or protection as against any other party." '193 The Committee
captured the crux of the arguments in favor of recognizing a self-
evaluative privilege for corporations that share the results of an
internal investigation with the SEC by stating:
Voluntary production of information that is protected by the
attorney-client privilege, other privileges, or the attorney work
product doctrine greatly enhances the [SEC's] investigative
efforts, and in some cases makes them more efficient. In many
cases, private parties would be willing to share privileged
information with the [SEC] if they could otherwise maintain the
privileged and confidential nature of the document. For example,
a company that retains outside counsel to conduct an internal
investigation concerning possible violations may be willing to
share the investigative report with the [SEC]. Under current
law, however, a party who produces privileged or protected
material to the [SEC] runs a very serious risk that a third party,
such as an adversary in private litigation, could obtain that
information by successfully arguing that production to the [SEC]
waived the privilege or protection. This presents a substantial
disincentive for anyone who might otherwise consider providing
the [SEC] useful information that is subject to a privilege or
protection.... [The SFDIRA] minimizes that disincentive. It does
... allow parties who choose to produce such materials to do so
without fear that their production to the [SEC] will be deemed
to waive the privilege or protection as to anyone else.'
The Committee continued to find that "[t]he protections of a clear
rule ... will help ensure that ... Federal functional regulators receive
necessary information about the respective financial services
providers that they regulate and that there is a free flow of informa-
tion between the regulated entity and the Federal regulator."'95
193. Id. at 13.
194. Id. at 24.
195. Id. at 25.
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Although the SFDIRA's current status remains unclear,"9 these
statements from the Committee's evaluation demonstrate a strong
legislative intent to promote voluntary disclosure of a corporation's
internal information by protecting this privileged material from
private third parties. Accordingly, this trend presents a strong
intuitive argument in favor of aligning judicial corporate policy with
current legislative sentiment by recognizing a self-evaluative
privilege for corporate internal investigations.
Moreover, the policy goals and motivations behind the self-
evaluative privilege are more faithful to those followed by Dela-
ware's Court of Chancery, arguably the nation's leading venue for
corporate litigation, than those represented by the current federal
approach. Recently, these courts have demonstrated a willingness
to move away from their historic reliance on the business judgment
rule19 7 in favor of a more flexible approach to evaluating corporate
governance. 9 According to one of the court's leading members,
"[t]he Delaware courts' traditional approach is to create incentives
for good things to happen, not to punish except through public
embarrassment and occasional money damages for egregious
conduct."'9 9 Not only has Delaware been able to promote proactive
corporate governance, but early indications suggest that they have
196. After its introduction in the House of Representatives on May 21, 2003, see United
States Cong., Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Sept. 12, 2004), the Committee on Financial Services
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
(Subcommittee) heard testimony regarding the SFDIRA. H.R. REP. No. 108-475, pt. 1, at 15.
Following its approval by both the Subcommittee and the Committee, see id., the SFDIRA
passed to the Committee on the Judiciary, and has since been placed on the Union calendar.
See United States Cong., Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
197. Traditionally, the Delaware Court of Chancery has used the business judgment rule
to dismiss shareholder litigation, which has led, in part, to Delaware's reputation as being a
corporation-friendly venue. John Gibeaut, Stock Responses, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2003, at 38. As
commonly stated, the business judgment rule stands for the proposition that
the actions of disinterested and independent directors-who after reasonable
investigation-adopt a course of action that they, in good faith, honestly and
reasonably believe will benefit the corporation will not be "second guessed," on
the merits of that decision.
Myron T. Steele, Nonbinding Opinions: A Delaware Justice Writes on Judging Corporate
Governance, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2003, at i7.
198. See Gibeaut, supra note 197, at 40.
199. Steele, supra note 197, at 18.
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done so without harming shareholders' access to the information
necessary to protect their ownership rights.'
In light of these recent developments, it seems that certain
judicial venues, as well as the federal executive and legislative
branches, are beginning to recognize the privileged nature of
information collected during an internal investigation. This
concurrence of opinions demonstrates that federal courts should also
recognize this reality when evaluating claims for a self-evaluative
privilege.
2. Addressing the Agency Problem
Clearly, one of the motivating concerns behind the federal
judiciary's approach to corporate governance is the recurring
problem of ensuring that corporate directors and managers take
actions that are in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.2"' Sometimes referred to as the agency problem in
corporate law, the intractable questions related to aligning share-
holder and management interests can and will be better addressed
by the recognition of a self-evaluative privilege than by a continua-
tion of the status quo. 8y recognizing a self-evaluative privilege,
federal courts can remove the considerable disincentives for
corporations to conduct proactive internal investigations. As
discussed in the context of Bergonzi, losing an internal investiga-
tion's privileged status can have devastating financial and legal
effects for a corporation.2 2 The fact that corporate internal investi-
gations frequently give rise to spin-off shareholder litigation makes
200. The trend toward increased shareholder activism demonstrates this new reality. For
example, the 2003 Annual Meeting season produced 324 shareholder proposals related to
executive compensation, as compared to 106 in 2002. Gibeaut, supra note 197, at 40. In
addition, the fact that Delaware's Courts of Chancery have taken a proactive approach to
corporate governance has not diminished their willingness to disclose corporate information
that does not meet the tests for privileged status. In fact, since June 2002, Delaware's
Supreme Court has reversed six decisions favoring directors, inciuding decisions relating to
shareholder attempts "to obtain documents supporting allegations of accounting
irregularities." Id. at 41.
201. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459,507 (1919) ("A business corporation
is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end.").
202. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
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the protections offered by a self-evaluative privilege even more
valuable. °3
Protecting the confidentiality of internal investigations is even
more confusing in the context of shareholder or derivative litigation
because of the general principle that "otherwise privileged commu-
nications between counsel and their corporate clients may be
discovered by plaintiffs in shareholder actions upon a showing of
good cause."20 4 This general rule rests on the assumption that a
corporation owes a fiduciary duty to shareholders that prevents it
from invoking the attorney-client privilege against its beneficia-
ries.20 5 Realistically, shareholder suits and derivative actions are no
less damaging than government enforcement actions. The extensive
consequences of disclosing an internal investigation under these
circumstances will go a long way toward eliminating the free flow
of information between managers and the board of directors,
corporations and government agencies, and employees and manag-
ers.
2 06
203. Block & Barton, supra note 84, at 84.
204. Id. This general rule is laid out in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th
Cir. 1970). In addition, Garner lays out specific indicia of good cause to which a court will look
in determining whether a party can access internal investigations. Id. at 1104. Although the
Garner rule is followed generally, in most cases where the rule is applied, courts usually deny
discovery in practice for lack of good cause. See Block & Barton, supra note 84, at 85. Some
courts have limited Garner "to discovery of the legal advice preceding the allegedly wrongful
conduct." Id. at 86.
205. Block & Barton, supra note 84, at 84. As stated by one commentator,
[s]hareholder suits ... present a conceptual dilemma for the attorney-client
privilege due to the fiduciary relationship that exists between the corporation
and its shareholders. Because the corporation exists for the benefit of the
shareholders, allowing the corporation free rein to assert the privilege against
these same shareholders appears anomalous. On the other hand, the corporation
will need to seek legal advice free from fear of disclosure to individual
shareholders who may not represent the best interests of the majority of
stockholders.
Schallert & Williams, supra note 69, at 349.
206. In fact,
[i] f discoverable by shareholders, the internal investigative report could provide
damning evidence of corporate wrongdoing, thereby laying the foundation for
shareholders' claims. Moreover, facts revealed in the internal investigative
report could spawn lawsuits not previously contemplated. Given the threat of
these consequences, corporations will be less likely to undertake internal
investigations and to document those findings in a written report.
Id. at 350.
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These arguments make it apparent that the self-evaluative
privilege offers a more effective and proactive solution to the
traditional agency problems of corporate governance than those
presented by the evidentiary privileges currently recognized by
federal courts.
3. Increasing Corporate Efficiency
In addition, there is an intuitive efficiency argument in favor of
recognizing a self-evaluative privilege for corporate internal
investigations. Ideally, corporations should appoint independent
directors who are committed to their shareholders' best interests.
Implicit in this idea of fiduciary duty is the directors' responsibility
to stay informed about the corporation's internal workings.2 °7 Under
the prevailing treatment of internal investigations, the possibility
of universal disclosure serves as a judicial bar to corporate directors
fulfilling their implied duty to stay informed. By recognizing a self-
evaluative privilege, courts can remove this significant disincentive.
As a result, directors may be able to use internal investigations as
a tool to improve corporate performance as opposed to focusing on
the risk management questions presented by the current system.
Accordingly, by recognizing a self-evaluative privilege, courts can
give corporate directors the benefits of another performance
improvement tool, which, in turn, will ultimately benefit their
shareholders.
4. Protecting the Public Interest
Finally, the public interest advanced by the self-evaluative
privilege is consistent, if not identical, to those cited in defense of
the existing attorney-client and work product privilege. The
attorney-client privilege is grounded in protecting the free flow of
information and full disclosure of material information between
attorneys and clients.2 8 In addition, the work product privilege has
been codified as an attempt to ensure a robust adversarial system,
as manifested in the complete discovery of information through the
207. See supra text accompanying note 68.
208. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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process of litigation.2" The lowest common denominator for both of
these privileges is that the public's interest is served most effec-
tively and efficiently by the complete and prompt disclosure of any
information that is material to an ongoing dispute. Parties who have
argued for applying the self-evaluative privilege to corporate
internal investigations have advanced this theme consistently as
the underlying public interest protected by this doctrine.2" In other
words, by preserving the confidentiality of internal investigations,
courts can actually further the public's interest in full and fair
disclosure of corporate information.
As in Bergonzi, assuring corporations that their internal investi-
gations will not become a matter of public record facilitates this flow
of information between corporations and the relevant oversight and
enforcement agencies. At the same time, the public receives an
added benefit when the government agencies charged with protect-
ing shareholders' interests have access to accurate information
collected by those closest to the daily corporate machinations.
Accordingly, the self-evaluative privilege will be able to protect the
public interest through complete and accurate disclosure of
information while also providing government agencies with the
necessary tools to fulfill their statutory mandates. Unfortunately,
the federal courts have not been receptive to these public policy
arguments. As the recent corporate scandals demonstrate,2 ' these
arguments have taken on new relevance and should be given a
closer examination.
5. Arguments for Maintaining the Status Quo
Opponents of the self-evaluative privilege have advanced
numerous arguments against it. As an initial matter, federal and
state courts have precedent on their side. Accordingly, arguments
for extending the self-evaluative privilege to corporate internal
investigations have received a consistently hostile reception.212 To
a certain extent, this hostility can be attributed to an historical
209. See supra text accompanying note 83.
210. See, e.g,, Sheppardv. Consol. Edison Co., 893 F. Supp. 6, 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (evaluating
a corporation's analysis of the public policy goals supporting the self-evaluative privilege).
211. See, e.g., supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
212. See SNIDER& ELLINS, supra note 138, at 6-3 nn.11-12.
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unwillingness to recognize new evidentiary privileges without
overwhelming public policy support.213 The resistance to developing
a self-evaluative privilege for corporations that cooperate with
government agencies, however, seems not only outdated but
downright harmful in light of recent corporate history.214
In addition, opponents of the self-evaluative privilege point to the
increasing activism among corporate shareholders as further
support for the position that new privileges are not necessary to
promote responsible corporate governance.1 5 In other words, the
current policies in favor of disclosing the results of an internal
investigation have achieved the intended effect of protecting the
public's interest against abuses by corporate management. The flood
.of corporate misbehavior that splashes across the newspapers on
almost a daily basis, however, stands in stark contrast to this bare
assertion.216 Regardless of the recent success realized by derivative
lawsuits, corporate shareholders at-large still face the twin
challenges of dispersion and disinterest. Accordingly, the investing
public must have faith that the government enforcement agencies
assigned to protect their interests will be able to achieve their
mandate. By their own admission, the DOJ and other agencies have
recognized that the self-evaluative privilege will only help them
achieve this goal.21 7
Finally, critics of the self-evaluative privilege often argue that
new privileges serve only to limit disclosure and restrict the range
of information that is available to the adversarial judicial process.218
Although this point raises important public policy concerns, it loses
its thrust in this context for several reasons. First, extending the
self-evaluative privilege to internal investigations would protect
only the actual report itself. As with the work product and attorney-
client privileges, an adversarial party can access any underlying
information through discovery and deposition. If plaintiffs are
allowed continued access to a corporation's report of their own
internal investigations, courts are, in essence, forcing a corporation
213. See Note, supra note 142, at 1084.
214. See, e.g., supra notes 4.8 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
217. See supra notes 49, 170-84 and accompanying text..
218. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 85, at 142-45.
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to outline a litigation strategy against itself. Second, the self-
evaluative privilege could only be extended to corporations claiming
this protection in order to disclose sensitive information to a
government enforcement agency. Accordingly, it seems nonsensical
to argue that removing incentives for a corporation to cooperate
with government agencies will be a more faithful attempt to
promote the goals of full and fair disclosure. On the contrary, by
guaranteeing that any information collected as part of an internal
investigation will maintain its privileged status, courts can take
great steps toward promoting full disclosure and protecting the
public's interest.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by Bergonzi, the question of whether a corpora-
tion waives its attorney-client and work product privileges by
sharing the results of an internal investigation with government
agencies is more pressing than ever. Although strong arguments
exist on both sides of this debate, the trend, both legislative and
regulatory, is moving toward greater recognition of the privileged
status of information collected during an internal investigation.
Accordingly, it is time for the federal court system to recognize this
movement and to bring its decisions in line with the prevailing
public policy that favors protecting corporate internal investiga-
tions. In light of the increasing pressure on corporations to cooper-
ate with government agencies, courts should abandon their
traditional positions on the waiver of privileged information
collected during internal investigations in favor of establishing a
self-evaluative privilege for corporations that volunteer this
information to government enforcement agencies. Clearly, the time
has come for a change in the dominant ethics and practices of
corporate governance. The question remains, however, whether the
law will recognize the potential for change embodied in the self-
evaluative privilege or continue to insist that no good deed goes
unpunished.
Theodore R. Lotchin
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